Russia has developed a successful model for tampering and weakening democratic institutions in developing countries to further its geostrategic aims. This topic is regularly discussed with reference to the string of successful coups orchestrated by members of the military in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, with varying levels of Russian support. However, there is less of a discussion about this strategy as it applies to Latin America. The Department of State, United States Institute of Peace and Constella Intelligence have documented the Kremlin’s attempts to pursue a similar strategy of destabilization in Latin American countries as it did in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger (United States Department of State 2023) (Farah and Ortiz 2023) (Nelson 2020).

This article briefly examines Mali as a text-book case of how the Kremlin achieves its political goals in vulnerable countries. Next, it explores evidence that Moscow and its proxies are pursuing a similar strategy in Latin America and the potential the strategy has in Latin America to replicate Russia’s success in the Sahel based on similarities in regional conditions. Finally, this article details the implications of Russia’s anti-democratic active measures strategy for regional stability and the effect it may have, as it has in the Sahel, on increasing the reach and violence of non-state actors, including terrorist organizations.

In Mali, Russian organisations linked to Putin’s entourage including the Internet Research Agency (IRA) coordinated disinformation campaigns targeting the French and UN forces deployed in the country to fight Jihadist insurgencies (Hassan and Hiebert 2021). The IRA in West Africa exploited pre-existing anti-French and anti-colonialist narratives which, while grounded in real grievances, had been stoked by Soviet propaganda. Examples of this include regular allegations by propaganda channels connected to Moscow that UN and French troops were secretly supporting the insurgents in Mali to destabilise the country and exploit its natural resources (Al Jazeera 2021).

An innovation of the post-Cold War Russian disinformation system used in Mali is the ability to establish propaganda channels tailored to audiences with different political beliefs using Telegram, Twitter, and other social media outlets (Paul and Miriam 2016) (Shynkarenko 2023). Channels aimed at left-wing audiences focus on exploitation of resources, financial imperialism, and historical grievances (Shynkarenko 2023) (Paul and Miriam 2016). Whereas channels aimed at right-wing audiences emphasize ‘cultural corruption,’ the loss of traditional values and other cultural subjects typically associated with the right.

The countries of the Sahel share many problems in common with those of Latin America, including low government legitimacy, persistent violent internal conflicts, and strong anti-Western sentiment. The presence of these problems may allow Russia to transfer its African strategy to Latin America wholesale.

The proof of concept can be found in a period of unrest that affected Colombia and Chile in 2019. Research by Constella Intelligence demonstrated that in some cases as few as 1% of users produced 33% of the posts sampled from online interactions during Colombia’s social unrest in 2019 (Nelson 2020). The same article found that of the 175 “anomalous identities” identified during the unrest in Colombia and Chile, nearly 60% could be traced to Venezuela (Nelson 2020). Caracas has a long history of collaborating on anti-American campaigns with Russia.

RT, a well-known Russian media outlet, is in many ways the glue connecting all these various kinds of messaging. RT has content sharing agreements with nine other Latin American mass media channels: Tele Sur, HispanTV (Iranian State Owned), Agencia Prensa Rural (Colombia), Kaosenlared, Red National y Popular (Venezuela), El Ciudadano (Facebook) (Farah and Ortiz 2023). A report by USIP details the framework for these campaigns. Russian government ministries, oligarchs, and think tanks determine the overall narratives to be disseminated to embassies, press offices, and social media figures who are then translated and adapted to suit local particularities most effectively (Farah and Ortiz 2023). These claims have been verified by an unnamed former employee of RT who confirmed this process in an interview. The report also names many social media influencers with large audiences who have been shown to have connections to Kremlin media arms like RT and Sputnik (Farah and Ortiz 2023).

The goal behind these ‘Grey Zone’ operations is to create ambiguity and doubt about what is true and create political fatigue regardless of affiliation. This kind of mass repetition induced fatigue cultivated through social media creates just enough doubt and ambivalence about a situation to allow non-democratic actors to manoeuvre. This was successfully leveraged in many countries in the Sahel, and when conducted in an already unstable and volatile political situation, it can have a serious impact.

The effectiveness of political messaging in West Africa can be attributed to a prevailing sense of hopelessness and dissatisfaction with the status quo since independence. A significant contributing factor is the alarming rate of youth unemployment, with young people susceptible to radicalization by messages promising to restore national dignity (Sakor 2020). This appeal is particularly strong in conservative societies where tradition holds a pivotal role. Additionally, ongoing insurgencies and general insecurity in many West African countries further exacerbate the severity of the crisis.

Importantly, these factors are not exclusive to West Africa; they mirror serious challenges faced by Latin America. In the region, armed drug traffickers are more active than ever, leading to escalating violence and prompting people to flee their countries, contributing to a pervasive sense of insecurity (International Crisis Group 2023). Youth unemployment and underemployment are pervasive issues (Murillo, et al. 2023), compelling individuals to join criminal networks in search of economic security (Sakor 2020). Historical animosity towards the United States is a common sentiment, especially within left wing circles. Moreover, religion and social conservatism are significant mobilizing forces, drawing parallels with West African countries.

While the risk of military coups in Latin America is currently lower due to stronger democratic institutions than in many West African states, it remains a plausible scenario if the socio-political climate deteriorates, with urgent warning signs emerging in the region. It is worth noting the close relationship between Iran, Venezuela, and Cuba, characterized by an ideological association rooted in a post-colonial struggle against neocolonialism, animosity towards the US, and partnership with Russia. This messaging has proven particularly effective in Latin America, exemplified by recent elections such as those of Lula in Brazil, Pietro in Colombia, and Luis Arce in Bolivia (successor of Evo Morales), all running on similar platforms. This is not to say all three were elected because of Russian disinformation campaigns but rather that the messaging is effective and is gaining momentum.

In conclusion, the factors that contributed to successful Russian disinformation and active measures campaigns in the Sahel exist in Latin America as well. The Russian campaign in the Sahel resulted in several successful coups and huge extractive concessions to Russian and associated companies, as well as the removal of effective international and western counter-insurgency partners in exchange for ineffective Russian mercenaries. If Russia’s Sahel strategy is successfully replicated in Latin America it could exacerbate the cycles of chronic violence, exploitation, and political ineffectiveness that have plagued the region for decades.